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Material presented in this paper neither promotes nor 
refutes the veracity of religion in general or any 
particular religion. Much of the paper draws upon the Roman 
Catholic Church for examples, a choice reflecting its 
importance in western history and familiarity to the 
authors. The authors welcome examples from other religions 





Religion is one of the most pervasive phenomena in the 
human experience. Since it is difficult to name any society 
througho~t history without some religious activity, 1 it is 
surprising that so little investigation of religion has been 
undertaken by economists. A few investigators, including 
Meng and Sentence (1984) and Tomes (198S), compare religion 
and individual earnings in a effort to establish whether 
religions have different attitudes toward investment in 
human capital. In a recent short jocose article, Dixit and 
Grossman (1984) show how a limited number of positions in 
heaven can result in rent-dissipating activity by 
consumers. 2 
Non-economists might explain our neglect of religion 
as a subject for study by claiming that behavior connected 
with religion is somehow separate and different from the 
maximizing behavior asserted in economics. However, the 
behavioral propositions of economics are silent about limits 
to their applicability. Gary Becker, for one, sees no such 
boundaries: "Indeed, I have come to the position that the 
lWe intentionally offer no formal definition of what 
constitutes religious activity. Any reasonable definition 
can be used without effect on this paper's conclusions. 
2Several important applications of economic theory to 
human behavior completely ignore the role of religion, North 
and Thomas (1973) and Posner (1980). 
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economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable 
to all human behavior."3 
In fact, economics offers an enticing apparatus to 
explain behavior of the entity known as the church: the 
theory of the firm. The fundamental behavioral postulate of 
the theory of the firm is that firms maximize wealth. To 
the non-economist it may seem offensive and absurd to 
ascribe such crass behavior to these benevolent non-profit 
institutions. Nonetheless, economists have good reason to 
expect that the wealth maximizing postulate leads to 
reliable explanations and predictions. For one, the 
continued survival of any institution requires it to face 
the possibility of bankruptcy. To continue to operate, an 
organization must maintain earnings in excess of opportunity 
cost. Organizations that survive over time necessarily are 
those that have been able to maintain positive net 
revenue. 4 
A possible objection here is that in societies with a 
single church, the absence of competition between churches 
means a church need only maintain non-negative wealth and is 
not obliged to maximize. 5 The response to this argument is 
that although the church may not be faced with competition 
3Becker (year), p. 8. 
4This follows ideas presented by Armen Alcian in 
"Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory" and Becker 
(1962). 
5The debate about whether a monopoly or, for that 
matter, any firm acts to maximize profit is almost endless. 
For a sample of the views see Alcian (1965). 
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from other churches, it is faced with competition from 
secular organizations in at least some markets. Further, 
all firms, churches included, compete for resources and are 
therefore forced to manage their activities in a manner 
identical to wealth maximizing behavior in many respects. 
The proposition of wealth maximizing behavior applied to 
churches may become more palatable by remembering that 
increased wealth affords an expanded opportunity set for the 
church. 
In addition to the assumption of wealth-maximization, 
applying the theory of the firm to activities of churches 
requires understanding the products they produce and sell. 
Churches offer a number of products to the faithful and the 
analysis of these classes of products forms the heart of 
this paper. As is shown, churches are at times uniquely 
qualified to provide certain of these products.' In other 
cases, churches provide products available in other markets. 
Changes in other institutions also cause changes in products 
offered by churches. 
In changing proportions over time and in different 
cultures, churches offer four classes of products. In this 
paper, these products' are labelled temporal bliss, social 
goods, infinite consumption stream, and altered fate. 
Temporal bliss is a set of products that bring happiness in· 
this earthly vale and are also produced in other markets, 
'Religion could be defined as this set of products. 
The church is the firm organized to provide these products. 
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products like fellowship and entertainment. The church only 
has limited ability to exclude potential competitors in 
offering these products. Entry by competing producers has 
predictable effects on church behavior. 
Social goods are products and activities characterized 
by significant po~itive external effects or have public 
goods characteristics. Included are enforcement of valuable 
property rights and good moral behavior. Under some 
circumstances, the church is uniquely qualified to provide 
these products. The rise of temporal authority in the form 
of a centralized government reduces the relative advantage 
of church production of social goods. 
An infinite consumption stream, the promise of eternal 
life, is a central feature in most religions. Eternal life 
has the characteristic that a contract of sale is 
unenforceable, since the buyer cannot know whether the price 
paid is appropriate, or whether information about the 
product is accurate. As expected, the church adopts 
techniques similar to other firms offering products with 
this characteristic, including use of non~disposable capital 
and an organized priesthood. 
Churches also offer the promise of favorably altering 
the course of events that might otherwise be described as 
random. The use of prayer or priestly intercession to alter 
fate is a cornmon feature of churches. This product is 
similar to eternal life in that a contract of sale is 
difficult to monitor. In addition, as the boundaries of 
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fate's definition shrinks, the ability of churches to sell 
alterations of fate is reduced. 
The next sections of this paper address each of these 
classes of products in turn. A final section addresses 





Ask an individual why he or she attends a particular 
church. One reason given, perhaps the most important 
reason,' is the fellowship of its members, some difficult-
to-define quality of the church and its membership which 
appeals to the individual. Separate from any religious 
doctrine" the church is providing members an enjoyable 
atmosphere.' 
Fellowship is one example of a set of valuable 
products provided by churches titled here temporal bliss. 
This valuable set of products might also be termed 
entertainment, defined as a wide spectrum of activities 
which increase consumer utility in this life. That 
religious ceremony and church activities have entertainment 
content in no way demeans their religious importance or 
sacredness, it simply describes characteristics of church 
activities that are of value to individuals and allows 
application of economic theory to make predictions about 
church behavior. 
'This conclusion is a result of an unscientific 
survey conducted while one of the authors was teaching 
sunday school some years ago. 
8For an example of Roman Catholics changing parishes 
to find desired characteristics, see Ingrassia (1982). 
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Churches offer a variety of types of entertainment. 
Entertainment in its highest sense is offered by churches in 
the form of sacred music and art. Other forms of 
entertainment include activities as diverse as potluck 
dinners, dances, and bingo. The church has served 
throughout history as a center for social activities 
particularly in smaller communities. 
Religious festivals in both ancient and modern times 
are in large part pure entertainment. The entertainment 
aspect of religion is glaringly evident each year beginning 
shortly before Thanksgiving when mistletoe is first hung. 
At least two of the important Christian holy days, Christmas 
and Easter, contain elements from religious festivals 
predating Christianity and have little connection to 
Christian doctrine other than entertainment. 
Christian liturgy contains frequent reference to 
"celebration," "celebrating mass" being an example. Even 
the term used suggests the importance of entertainment. In 
defense of their activities, religious leaders often argue 
entertainment is used to attract potential converts or make 
the message more palatable. The statement acknowledges the 
value to consumers of the entertainment offered by churches. 
Even the pastoral sermon, whose official purpose is 
instruction, contains undeniable entertainment content. 
Describing a pastor's weekly presentation as "a good sermon" 
means more than simply sound religious content. It means 
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quality story-telling, drama, excitement--in a word-­
entertainment. 
Pastoral.sermons and religious ceremonies are not 
always characterized by pleasant distraction. Some cultures 
practice physical mutilation for religious reasons.' Many 
church services are noted for the use of fearsome threats, 
the Puritan sermons being a classic example. While at first 
blush these activities seem not be be classed as 
entertainment, it is instructive to compare them to 
contemporary activities offered as entertainment outside the 
church. The cathartic effect of a rousing hell-fire sermon 
is certainly equal to that of a quality horror movie. 
As can be inferred from the preceding discussion, one 
important aspect of the various products called temporal 
bliss is that, to a greater or lesser extent, they can be 
provided in private markets. Entertainment and fellowship 
in most of their incarnations are not the unique purview of 
the church. It is this potential for entry and competition 
by other producers which yields implications about church 
provision of temporal bliss. 
That the church is only one possible producer of 
temporal bliss doesn't mean the church eschews attempts to 
become or remain the only actual producer. The church, as 
'Can physical mutilation have entertainment value? 
Surely not in our enlightened age. 
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much as other firms, has incentive to create and enforce a 
monopoly on production of its product. 10 
Churches have engaged in a number of activities, one 
of whose interpretations might reasonably be monopoly 
maintenance. From time to time churches have proscribed 
dancing, alcohol, gambling, dating, movies, makeup, and 
video games, all forms of entertainment available outside 
the church. To the extent that such restrictions are 
successful, the church maintains its position as sole 
producer of entertainment. In at least one case, the church 
promotes an activity within the church and discourages the 
same activity outside the church, even managing to obtain 
state enforcement: bingo gambling. 
As mentioned, the church has no unique ability to 
offer temporal bliss. As personal income increases and 
entertainment technology improves, entry by competing 
producers of temporal bliss likely occurs. 11 Entry of 
substitutes to church entertainment causes predictable 
changes in church behavior. Churches must increase quality 
of the valuable observable products they offer. Church 
buildings become more stylish architecturally, church 
services are offered at more convenient hours, church 
lOThe most obvious example of efforts to maintain 
dominance in religious power are religiously inspired wars. 
These are not addressed here since they arguably have little 
to do with ensuring a monopoly in production of 
entertainment. 
llEntry by competing churches is discussed later. 
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survives take less time and may be flashier. The use of 
music and other entertainment increases. 1z 
12The authors are aware of a church in Minneapolis 
which offers three simultaneous services, each of a 





Lightly bump a fellow passenger in an elevator. 
Chances are good that the fellow passenger responds with a 
polite "excuse me." Chances are better that the fellow 
passenger expects an identical polite response. All 
cultures have social rules encompassing the spectrum of 
behavior from accidental bumping to murder. Throughout 
history, religions and churches have been a central force in 
creating and perpetuating social rules. These social rules 
and some important group activities are here termed social 
goods. This section reviews some of these social goods, 
considers their value, introduces reasons why churches 
provided them historically, and explains why churches have 
lost much of their importance in providing these products. 
Religions typically include as part of their doctrine 
a set of behavioral guidelines. The Ten Commandments are 
the basic behavioral guidelines of the Judeo-Christian 
religions. Although studying and categorizing a society's 
social rules is appropriately the purview of 
anthorpologists, a substantial portion are amenable to 
economic analysis. These rules of behavior provide several 
economically valuable functions. 
13 
Most importantly, religious rules are a low-cost 
method of establishing and enforcing property rights. 13 In 
the simple view, these property rights include rules of 
ownership and trade that facilitate individual maximizing 
behavior. For example, religious rules commonly define the 
distribution of property at marriage. Such a clear 
definition of property rights reduces the cost of trade 
between and within families. The social rules defining 
legal and illegal theft is also an example of useful social 
rules defining property rights. A well-defined set of 
property rights are essential to wealth maximization by 
voluntary trade. 
The importance of well-defined rules of social 
behavior cannot be underestimated. Voluntary transaction 
simply cannot take place without agreed rules of exchange. 
The lower the cost of establishing rules of exchange, the 
more likely valuable trading takes place. The economic 
significance of religious doctrine is not limited to 
defining property rights, however. 
More generally, religious rules reduce the cost of the 
whole universe of social interaction by providing a 
consistent set of standards to all members of a culture. 
13That social rules and traditions reduce transactions 
costs has been asserted by other economists, Cheung (1972) 
and Posner (1980, p. 26). 
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This aspect of religious rules can be viewed as defining 
property rights in their broadest sense. l • 
Religions also encourage or include in their doctrine 
a variety of behavioral requirments that arguably benefit 
society but are not best described as defining property 
rights. Two examples of these social activities are income 
redistribution and health standards. ls In these cases, 
religions encourage individual behavior which benefits the 
group. 
By most social welfare functions, povertyl' makes 
society worse off and a redistribution of income makes 
society better off. A cornmon characteristic of church 
doctrine is the encouragement of redistribution of income. 
Members of churches are encouraged to engage in charitable 
activities directly, or to donate money to support 
charitable activities organized by the church. l7 To the 
extent that churches succeed in mitigating the adverse 
l·The relative success of religious versus non­
religious communes shows the advantage of having the ability 
to enforce and encourage good social behavior in a situation 
where achieving proper individual incentives is very
difficult. 
150ther examples include preservation of knowledge, 
some kinds of scientific research, education, and dispute 
mediation. 
1'Poverty here can refer to both an unequal 
distribution of income and to a segment of the population 
which is at subsistence level or less. 
17Churches are also notorious for adopting the double 
standard of supporting income transfer to poor within the 
church and discouraging income transfer to heathens. Such 
is the arbitrary nature of what constitutes the boundaries 
of society in a social welfare function. 
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effects of poverty, society is better off. Churches provide 
a valuable product, ultimately benefitting rich and poor 
alike. 
A second example of a social good provided by the 
church is health standards. Various forms of church imposed 
rules of cleanliness, medical treatment, food preparation, 
and sanitation are common. The benefit to society of such 
rules is obvious. All members of a society gain by engaging 
in activities which reduce the possibility of the spread of 
disease. Kosher rules of eating are an excellent example of 
church rules whose effect is arguably to assure proper 
nutrition and reduce the spread of disease. 11 
Surely a number of examples can be found of church 
health rules which make society worse off. Church bans on 
eating certain nutritious food, or church adoption of 
dangerous medical practices are examples. Although in 
retrospect such standards are dangerous to society, likely 
these standards were originally adopted in the sincere 
belief of their benefit. 
The social rules discussed above share important 
characteristics. These rules are characterized as public 
goods or possess significant external effects. For example, 
an individual engaging in good health practice is directly 
better off because of the reduced probability of disease. 
1iOne obvious implication here is that, ceterus 
paribus, regions with greater population density or greater 
tendency to support disease should have churches with more 
complicated health rules than other regions. 
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In addition, all other members of the community are also 
better off since the given individual is less likely to 
spread disease to them. This second, indirect effect, is an 
external effect since the direct benefit to the individual 
is smaller than the benefit to the entire community. The 
second effect is a public good since all members of the 
community benefit collectively from the action of the single 
individual. The same reasoning is applied to describe 
income redistribution and other social goods as either 
creating positive externalities or being public goods. 
In private markets, public goods and goods with 
positive external effects tend to be underproduced. 
Individuals have difficulty appropriating the value of the 
good to other members of the community and so are less 
inclined to produce it. Enter the church. The church 
possesses characteristics which give it unique abilities in 
encouraging production of public goods and goods with 
external effects. The relative ability of the church to 
encourage production of these goods is not identical in all 
cultures, however, and predicting church behavior requires 
understanding a stylized set of cultures. Given the 
standard stylized cultures considered here, the theory 
predicts religion is most effective in producing social 
goods in cultures with communities of substantial size but 




Members of a very small community recognize the social 
loss of poverty and are more inclined to act to reduce it. 
These cultures often rely on close family groups and often 
practice some form of communal behavior where wealth sharing 
is an explicit part of the organization. 
In larger communities, the rich are less likely to see 
the social cost of poverty and less likely to participate 
since anyone person's gain is smaller than the social gain 
from transferring income to the poor. Community size is 
large enough that interaction takes place outside family 
groups. Religious requirements of income transfer are 
important to continue provision of this valuable social 
product. 
Private markets find provision of goods with 
significant external effects or public goods difficult. In 
larger communities, especially those with an underdeveloped 
central government, the church can encourage production of 
these social goods. The church encourages production of 
these goods first by enforcing its prescription for behavior 
in the same manner chosen by secular authorities by using 
techniques like incarceration and torture. 
Religions have two additional low-cost enforcement 
tools: the threat of social ostracism and the the threat of 
unavoidable and severe punishment after death. In the 
Catholic Church, for example, excommunication carried both 
the loss of social status in the community and eternal 
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damnation. l' The specifics of punishment after death vary 
from religion to religion. In some, an offender may be 
condemned to the fires of hell, in another, the offender may 
be reincarnated as a person of low caste or as an animal. 
Hell or punishment is treated differently than heaven. 
Also treated separately are those who are ignorant or too 
young to conform to behavioral standards. Heaven is a 
product desired by consumers and produced by most churches. 
Hell is certainly not desired by consumers and is less often 
a feature of church doctrine. Hell punishes sinners, those 
who misbehave. 
In recent history many of the functions of religions 
to provide social goods have been provided by secular 
authority: the government. An implication is that the 
general decline in the importance of religion in general and 
hell in particular may be due to technological developments 
having the effect of altering the relative costs of 
different methods of property rights enforcement and 
monitoring behavior. 20 This is the explanation presented by 
North and Thomas (1973). 
l'In the Mormon religion (real name) an additional 
reward for good behavior or punishment for bad behavior is 
that all of a person's relatives may achieve heaven if a 
person converts. In those religions which feature heaven or 
hell as predestined, the church has relatively little power 
to enforce good social behavior. 
2°It is not immediately clear what these innovations 
were. Certainly important was the ability to organize and 
maintain a sizeable standing police force or army. Not that 
Henry VIII is reputed to have been an exceptional military 
and civil leader, exactly the requirements necessary to 
supplant the authority of the Pope. 
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Religion is a substitute for secular authority. This 
enforcement of property rights operates first through 
explicit prescription for behavior (like the Ten 
Commandments). Second, while churches often possessed the 
authority to enforces these prescriptions in the same manner 
that secular authorities have, religions are characterized 
by a unique instrument of low-cost enforcement. This the 
the threat of unavoidable and severe punishment by devine 
force after death. 
This line of argument suggests that problems in 
enforcement would result in societies with two or more 
religious views of devine retribution after death. 
Difficulties would arise not so much out of conflicting 
behavioral prescription, but out of reduced perceived 
probability of enforcement. It is more likely that there 
are more doubters about the inevitability of devine 
retribution if a large number people are telling a different 
story. An implication is that crime rates are higher the 
greater the religious heterogeneity. Such religious 
heterogeneity also makes secular authority relatively more 
appealing to enforce good social behavior. 
Another possibility is that increases in individual 
income mean there is more for secular authority to take away 
as punishment for breaking laws. The loss of eternal life 
is relatively more important for a poor person than for a 
rich person, thus the threat of loss of income is a greater 
deterrent for wealthy people. This implication requires the 
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assumption of positive time preference for consumption even 
after death. The assumption also requires that consumers 
cannot take wealth with them when they die. In religions 
where wealth is carried into death, religious authority 
maintains the relative threat of eternal damnation in the 
face of increasing income. The relative strength of the 
Egyptian theocracy is an example. 
Increases in temporal wealth also reduce the 
attractiveness of heaven. This may explain why less 
emphasis placed on heaven in modern religions. In some 
modern religions people are believed to go to heaven 
automatically. 
The longstanding objection by religions to the 
practice of usury may be another example of an external 
effect which creates divergence between private and social 
cost. The socially optimal discount rate may be lower than 
the discount rate chosen by lenders in the market. Until 
recently, the absence of the corporation prevented lenders 
from pooling or diversifying risk or from perpetuating 
assets over the lifetime of one individual. The short 
lifetime of individuals might make them unwilling to invest 
in projects of long duration and might incorrectly estimate 
the cost to society of death of one individual. 
Perhaps a more important reason for churches to object 
t usury is that the practice encourages a positive discount 
rate. As mentioned, a positive discount rate reduces the 
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cost of punishment after death relative to punishment before 
death. 2l 
A society gains if its members produce the sort of 
social goods discussed here. The church has advantages in 
encouraging production of these products because of its 
unique enforcement tools. However, like any firm, the 
church must maintain positive net income to support these 
valuable activities. In concluding this section, a couple 
of comments on church finance are in order. 
For some services it offers, the church charges a 
direct fee and only those paying the fee receive the 
service. Examples of direct fees include admission to some 
church events, membership fees for some churches, and 
indulgences. A second and more common revenue source is 
member voluntary donations. Donations are considered 
voluntary since the product is provided to the individual 
whether or not a donation is made. For most modern 
churches, membership requires no donations. 
That donations are not required, does not mean they 
can freely be withheld. Church doctrine and social pressure 
combine to encourage member donation. This social pressure 
is particularly important in providing financial support for 
alAn implication is that individuals with low 
individual rates of time preference are more likely to be 
law-abiding and church members, heaven being relatively more 
valuable (and hell relatively more costly) than for 
individuals with high rates of time preference. The same 




public goods, since non-payers for public goods still 
benefit. 
In some ways, the church is particularly well-adapted 
to earn revenue from members. In particular, the church can 
price discriminate with relative ease. Conditions for 
successful price discrimination include the ability to 
identify consumer willingness to pay and prevent resale. 
For the first condition, the typically long relationship 
between members and the church and the information available 
from other members, means information about income, for 
example, is readily available to a church. In the second 
category, the church has special advantage since many of its 
products, like eternal life, are non-transferrable. 
The ability to price discriminate in part solves the 
problem of financing public goods. Optimal provision of 
public goods requires vertical summation of demand curves. 22 
Perfect price discrimination serves this function. 23 
A second method used to obtain finance for public 
goods is by combining sale of a public good with sale of 
another good. the use of this tie-in sale is a technique 
discussed by economists in the literature on voluntary clubs 
and trade associations. 24 
22For the traditional treatment see Stigler (1954, 
1955). 
23Buchanan (1967). 
24For a survey see Sandler (1980). The classic 
treatment of public goods production is by Olson (1965). 
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Infinite Consumption Stream 
List the ten most important works of art. Look at 
books describing history's most important buildings. The 
examination shows that throughout history, the single most 
important institution supporting architecture and art is 
religion. Cathedrals, temples, and shrines surely stand as 
awesome and impressive tributes to the commitment and power 
of religious belief. 
The magnitude of the enterprise of building cathedrals 
makes the practice especially fascinating from an economic 
perspective. Several non-exclusive explanations for this 
practice may be offered within the context of wealth 
maximization. Cathedrals are a disposition of wealth in a 
form that not only is functional (generates revenue and 
serves as shelter for services) and durable, but cannot be 
stolen for gain by the less reverent. Another obvious 
function of using wealth in this manner is for advertising. 
Another related explanation is that cathedrals serve a 
quality-assurance function in a manner described by Klein 
and Leffler (1981). This last hypothesis not only explains 
construction of cathedrals, but explains a variety of the 
characteristics shared by church institutions and 
activities. Understanding this theory requires returning to 
the central theme of this paper: churches provide several 
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important classes of products, the nature of which permit 
behavioral predictions. 
One product provided by religions is an infinite 
consumption stream, the promise of eternal life. Some form 
of eternal life is a feature of each of the modern world's 
major religions and is a common feature in religions 
throughout history. The product eternal life shares 
important characteristics with products produced in non­
religious markets and the techniques used to predict 
behavior in these markets can describe church behavior as 
well. 
Although of limited interest for the theory presented 
here, one characteristic shared by the product eternal life 
and other products is price. A money price is used for most 
non-church goods. For eternal life, a money price or direct 
25payment is common but not universal. More often, eternal 
life is a results from adopting certain beliefs or engaging 
in certain actions. 26 For a few religions, heaven is 
assured for all or predestined and so beyond individual 
control. 
However, the important characteristic of eternal life 
as a product is the difficulty in assuring consumers of the 
accuracy of information provided by churches. It is this 
25Payment for forgiveness of sin (indulgence) was 
common in the Roman Catholic church. In some religions, a 
consumer can buy heaven for others, alive or dead. 
26Actions required often benefit society, that is, 
produce the social goods discussed in the previous section. 
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characteristic which allows application of economic theory 
and derivation of implications about church behavior. 
Nelson (1970, 1974) characterizes consumer products as 
possessing search qualities and experience qualities. 
Search qualities are readily apparent upon inspection and 
before purchase. Attributes like color, price, and size can 
be determined before purchase. By contrast, experience 
qualities cannot be determined until after purchase. For 
example, the taste of food and durability of products can 
only be determined after purchase. 
Darby and Karni (1973) introduce a special class of 
experience qualities called credence qualities. These 
attributes cannot be determined even after purchase. The 
service of a doctor has credence attributes. A consumer may 
not be able to tell if the service (an operation perhaps) is 
needed, may not be able to tell if the operation is 
performed, and may not be able to tell if the operation 
achieves the desired result. Other products which possess 
credence characteristics include the services of lawyers and 
auto mechanics. 27 
Special problems are associated with provision of 
credence goods (products dominated by credence attributes). 
In particular, producers of credence goods have incentive to 
27That used autos have some credence characteristics 
is the source of this paper's title. 
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cheat consumers by providing products of inferior quality21, 
or not providing the promised goods at all. Note that the 
problem exists because consumers cannot perceive 
characteristics of the good even after purchase. The 
problem disappears if consumers are trained to perceive the 
characteristics or can produce the product themselves. In 
these cases, the special methods the market adopts are not 
necessary. 
This same reasoning applies to achievement of eternal 
life. For some churches, individuals are encouraged to 
discover or confirm for themselves the means to achieve 
eternal life. The Protestant Reformation held as one key 
precept reading the bible to determine for oneself its 
messages. By contrast, traditional Roman Catholic doctrine 
relied on specialists (priests) to provide information about 
achieving eternal life. To the extent that information 
about it is provided by experts, eternal life takes on 
characteristics of a credence good. 
Given the potential for abuse by experts providing 
credence goods, why rely on priests to provide information 
about eternal life? For the same reasons specialists 
produce virtually every good: the advantages of 
specialization and gains from trade. A specialized priest 
class reduces the cost of obtaining information about 
21For another treatment of the problems in providing 
what amounts to credence goods and some other market 
solutions see Akerlof (1970). . 
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eternal life and allows individuals to specialize in 
activities in which they have a comparative advantage. 
The advantages of priestly specialization are 
particularly relevant in pre-literate agricultural 
societies, pre-literate here meaning societies where a 
written language exists but is not widely known. A written 
language preserves religious literature but has no other 
value to the average consumer. The opportunity cost to that 
same consumer of learning to read and interpret religious 
literature is substantial, however, involving as it does the 
sacrifice of time required for subsistence farming. 
The implication here is that organized priesthoods 
should reach their height of power in pre-literate 
agricultural societies. The relative strength of the 
Catholic Church in the third world is consistent with this 
implication. The argument holds to a lesser degree in 
societies with considerable specialized religious activity 
but without written language. 
Both consumers and honest producers of credence goods 
gain if methods are found to assure product quality, quality 
defined as providing promised product characteristics or 
accurate information. Specialized producers 29 of eternal 
life use a number of tools, similar to those used for other 
credence goods, to ensure product quality. 
2 
9 The church does not actually produce eternal life, 
obviously, but does provide information on actions required 
to achieve eternal life. 
28 
In the case of information about eternal life, 
churches have two specific objectives. First, the church 
wishes to assure consumers that priests sincerely believe in 
their doctrine, and so are less likely to knowingly lie for 
personal gain. Second, the church wishes to assure 
consumers that priests and ~he church have scant opportunity 
to embezzle donations, thus reducing the incentive to 
misrepresent doctrine and exploit believers. 
Churches use a number of tools to convince buyers of 
eternal life that priests sincerely believe 30 in their 
product and will not intentionally cheat consumers. Members 
of a priesthood typically cannot be ordained without a long 
apprenticeship, characterized by intense religious teaching 
and great personal sacrifice. Note that the purpose and 
character of the apprenticeship is more than simple learning 
of doctrine. The physical and emotional sacrifice goes 
beyond that required to learn religious doctrine but does 
serve as a selection process. Those unwilling to make the 
sacrifices or accept the precepts of the religion are 
eliminated during the apprenticeship. The apprenticeship 
serves to select only quality experts and thus assures 
consumers that priest provide accurate information. Both 
the church and consumers gain by this quality assurance. 
30While it may ·be impossible to prove the existence of 
life after death, it· is possible to assure consumers that 
churches believe there is life after death and that certain 
steps must be taken to achieve it. 
29
 
A similar argument is used by Leffler (1978) to 
explain the strict and apparently punative internship and 
residency requirements and various medical school 
restrictions. Leffler shows how these entry-restricting 
activities serve to assure product quality, vital for the 
31credence good called medical care. 
Requiring of priests unusual and demanding behavior 
need not end with the apprenticeship. The prospect of 
continued demanding behavior serves to select quality 
priests as well. Requirements for unusual dress, beards, 
hairstyle, and physical mutilation of apprentices and 
priests can be considered quality-assuring. 
Restricting entry by using a demanding apprenticeship 
helps assure consumers that priests are true believers. 
Churches also adopt policies that reduce incentive on the 
part of priests to embezzle donations for personal gain. 
Many priesthoods require poverty and chastity. In addition 
to being another demanding screening device, these 
requirements reduce the ability of priests to obtain 
personal income from believers, again assuring consumers of 
product quality. Chastity or celibacy 32 reduces the ability 
31Versions of this selection process can be observed 
in other professions with credence characteristics, 
including law. Another view on the role of training in 
assuring quality is Spence (1973), who asserts such training 
provides information about labor quality to an employer. 
32Celibacy has not always been a requirement of Roman 
Catholic priests but was adopted in 1215 A.D. For a summary 
of Christian celibacy practices see Encyclopaedia of 
Religion and Ethics. 
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and incentive of a priest to obtain money to pass to heirs. 
The requirement by some churches that priests dress in 
particularly poor clothing is another example. 
The church also often encourages good deeds and 
volunteer activity as an alternative to direct donation. 
Presumably cash payments would be a more efficient method of 
payment considering the opportunity cost of foregone wages 
for volunteer labor. Aside from potential tax advantages, 
such volunteer activities also assure a transfer of wealth 
in a form that cannot be readily embezzled by church 
authorities. Such protection again assures high quality 
production of a credence good. 
Suppliers of eternal life use other techniques to 
assure consumers that the product is authentic. Cathedrals 
have attributes which serve to assure high quality. 
Cathedrals are a disposition of wealth in a form that has 
little alternative use. Ornate structure, not adapted for 
commercial use, and unique symbols built into the structure, 
not useful for another religion or commercial activity, are 
examples. Klein and Leffler (1981) use the idea of non­
disposable capital to describe use by producers of assets 
which assure quality by having limited alternative use. 
Because of the substantial investment involved, consumers 
are assured that the church is not about to receive this 
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Sunday's offerings and then slip out of town. Nor can the 
priest sell the church and flee with the earnings. 33 
Cathedrals are only one type of non-disposable asset 
used by churches. Many church-endowed art is of a non­
disposable form. Sculpture is often built in a building in 
a form that prevents its removal. S~cred art often depicts 
events unique to a religion and of no value to other 
religions. Art is often tied to shrines or cathedrals. 
Wall paintings and tile floors are two examples of art built 
into a building in a non-disposable form. 
Even religious clothing and jewelry has arguably non­
disposable characteristics. Priestly clothing 34 is often 
very specialized and distinctly different from secular garb. 
Often the clothing is ornate and expensive. Such clothing 
is a form of church wealth that is not readily convertible 
to alternative use and so assures product quality. The same 
argument holds for much religious jewelry, whose value in 
alternative use would be a small fraction of its value in 
primary use. Another example is churches which record 
sacred literature in an expensive manner, the illuminated 
bibles of the middle ages being one case. 
33Churches are sold and put to alternate use 
occasionally. The important point is that the sale price is 
only a small fraction of the value of the church in its 
primary use. Thus the value of the church is largely non­
disposable and is sacrificed upon sale. 
34Note that even in those religions where priestly 
clothing is poor, it is usually of a specialized design or 
color not easily adapted to alternative use. 
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To review. In cases where consumers rely on expert 
priests to provide information of the credence good eternal 
life, churches adopts several techniques to assure consumers 
that the church and its priests is not misrepresenting 
itself. These techniques include an apprenticeship which 
selects quality priests, policies which prevent wealth 
accumulation by priests, and methods of preserving church 
wealth in a form which, like a cathedral, has limited 
alternative use. These techniques are not adopted in 
religions where individual consumers are able to or 
encouraged to determine product quality on their own. 
As an illustration, consider behavior of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the middle ages, a period of considerable 
church strength. In this era, priests were the sole source 
of information about eternal life. This period is 
characterized by substantial accumulation of non-disposable 
capital in cathedrals, art, and jewelry. Priestly celibacy 
began in this era as well. 
In contrast, consider behavior of the modern Quaker 
church. Quaker's do not rely on priests, and in fact have 
no formal religious leaders. Not surprisingly, Quaker 
meeting houses are disposable in the extreme, often being 
converted from some other use, or are even homes. 
In an intermediate position are modern Protestant, and 
to some degree, modern Catholic churches. Here ministers 
are viewed as teachers rather than experts. Behavior of 
ministers is monitored by the local parishioners who are 
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considered competent to make decisions on church doctrine, a 
process sometimes made in conventions open to non­
specialists. Non-disposable capital is less important and 
priestly training emphasizes simple education over quality 
assurance. 
As an alternative hypothesis, the Roman Catholic 
Church may be viewed as a franchise operation with the 
parent organization in some central location. In this case, 
central control and management assures consumers uniform 
quality by enforcing behavior standards on all priests. 
As with other franchises there are several issues of 
managerial contro1 35 which arise within the church. One 
practice of the Catholic Church may be explained as a method 
to restrict wealth leakage. The requirement of celibacy of 
the priests would prevent inheritance of church property out 
of the church. Why then did Protestant religions not adopt 
the same practice? At their inception they has little 
wealth to lose. Further, they were faced with the severe 
difficulties of entering a highly monopolized market with 
little working capital. One low-cost way to attract 
35Questions of managerial control are not restricted 
to franchises. Managerial control refers to methods by 
which employee behavior is directed into desired areas. Of 
particular importance in this respect is the method by which 
employees are paid. A familiar example is the effect of 
paying by the load versus paying by the hour on the speed at 
which a truck driver runs his vehicle. The way in which 
priests are paid is clearly an interesting question. In the 
salary fixed per year? Is the salary set and paid for by 
the congregation or by a higher level in the church 




employees (ministers> would be to offer them freedom from 
the celibacy vow. George Stigler once claimed that no 
monopoly has persisted for as long as one hundred years, but 
he overlooked the Catholic Church whose monopoly persisted 
for over a thousand years. 3' In this context, Martin Luther 
may be viewed as the outstanding market entrant of all time. 
3'Stigler ignores the Jewish religion which might, in 
any case, be treated more as a fringe firm rather than a 





The world is an uncertain and, in many ways, 
frightening place. A plethora of events surrounding and 
influencing our lives seem beyond our control, even beyond 
our ability to anticipate. That having some notion of the 
course of future events is valuable to individuals is not 
surprising. One look at the horiscopes and prognostications 
filling pages of popular literature confirms the value of 
precognition. Even less surprising is the fact that the 
ability to influence life's moments is also valuable to 
individuals. Religions and churches have throughout history 
played a crucial role in providing these valuable services 
to consumers. 
Altered fate is the term used in this paper to 
describe several valuable and related products produced by 
religions. For one, churches offer explanations of events 
beyond human control. By offering answers to questions 
beyond obvious understanding, the church seeks to satisfy 
the human desire to bring order to the world. Explanation 
of the origin of the universe is an example. 37 Another 
valuable product is predictions of future events. Again, 
37The at times angry debate between the biblical and 
scientific views of the universe's creation is an example of 
the value humans place on information defining an orderly 
universe, even when that information arguably has no direct 
effect on those same humans. 
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the church provides valuable information in cases where 
temporal sources are insufficient. The prophetic books of 
the Bible are an example of church prediction. The church 
also offers to change the future, to influence the course of 
events in a manner of use to believers. Priestly 
intercession, laying on of hands, and charmed objects are 
church methods of altering future events. Similarly, the 
church provides information about actions, like prayer and 
sacrifice, believers must take to alter events. 
That the church offers the set of products listed here 
does not imply the church is the only firm offering these 
products. As with most of the other classes of products 
discussed in this paper, the church faces competition from 
other producers. Most significantly in the case of altered 
fate, competition comes from scientific knowledge." 
Scientific predictions, scientific explanations, and 
scientific techniques are the main alternative to the church 
for these products. Other competing sources include good-
luck charms, tarot cards, horiscopes, superstition," and 
quack medicine, to name a few. 
"The authors offer no formal definition of scientific 
knowledge and pray that variation in reader definitions has 
insignificant effect on this paper's conclusions. Defining
scientific knowledge as being exclusive of supernatural 
knowledge may be as useful, although as arbitrary as any 
definition. In addition, the authors do not wish to imply
that scientific explanations are in any way superior or 
inferior to non-scientific explanations. 
"Churches constantly oppose as instruments of evil 
most of these alternative sources of altered fate. Such a 
policy both assures the quality of church information and 
restricts entry by competing producers. 
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The presence of competing sources of the set of 
products labelled altered fate certainly affects church 
behavior. In particular, scientific advances have changed 
the boundaries of what is commonly perceived as the purview 
of religious explanation. As an example, the dramatic 
growth in medical science has resulted in a significant 
reduction in church medical activity. No modern church 
promises cures for disease exclusive of scientific 
medicine. 40 Not surprisingly, church efforts against 
disease are commonly directed to those diseases (like 
terminal cancer) where scientific medicine has limited 
application. 
Despite the presence of competing sources of altered 
fate, however, churches are a significant force in providing 
these products. That the church successfully offers these 
products is not surprising. As with other products 
discussed in this paper, the church is uniquely qualified to 
provide altered fate. In fact, the discussion of altered 
fate as a church-produced product is basically a review of 
material presented earlier. 
In the first case, most products in the class altered 
fate have significant credence qualities. Accuracy of 
church information cannot be confirmed even after the 
information is obtained. Explanations of the origin of the 
universe are an example of valuable information that has 
4°Christian Scientists believe scientific medicine 
does cure or prevent disease but oppose scientific medicine 
as a matter of religious principle. 
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credence qualities. Church provision of credence goods was 
discussed in a previous section. If consumers rely on 
expert priests to provide information, the church uses a 
demanding priesthood 41 and non-disposable capital to assure 
product quality. 
Altered fate contains several products, each with a 
different degree of credence quality content. Not, 
surprisingly, we would expect the church to specialize in 
production of those at which it has a comparative advantage, 
those with the greatest credence content. If consumers have 
some ability to confirm the information provided, the church 
is less likely to provide expert help and more likely to 
encourage individual production. As an example, churches 
should encourage individuals to pray for a cure for disease 
rather than rely on an expert, since the result of the 
action is observable. By contrast, information about the 
origin of the universe is more likely provided by expert 
priests. 
In addition to credence qualities, altered fate often 
has characteristics of a public good. Information in 
general is non-rival in consumption, its use by one person 
does not reduce the quantity available to others. In 
addition, changes in future events or predictions often 
affect a number of people simultaneously. 
410ne direction for research is to consider to what 
degree scientists (experts) are similar to priests in 
providing information about products with credence 
qualities. 
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One obvious example of such a public good is seasonal 
weather prediction. 42 In agricultural and pastoral 
cultures, information about seasonal changes is valuable. 
Because of its public good characteristic, private markets 
may produce too little of this information. In the absence 
of a central government, the church can provide this 
information. As discussed, the church can price 
discriminate, use tie-in sales, and apply social pressure to 
obtain support for production of public goods. That 
churches in pre-literate cultures commonly create and 
preserve calendars appears to confirm this implication. 
42In this, as in some other cases, the boundary 
between prediction and alteration is fuzzy. A church may 
come to believe it is altering weather when in fact it is 
predicting weather. For example, a church may come to 
believe a human sacrifice is necessary at a certain phase of 
the moon each year to bring a change in weather for 
planting. The technique always works. 
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Some Other Issues 
Monotheism 
Pertaining to a discussion on scarcity, Professor 
Steven Cheung once asked the rhetorical question: "Why 
aren't there more gods?" Of course at one time there was 
quite an abundance of gods throughout the world. A more 
appropriate question for Cheung to have asked in this 
context is why are monotheistic religions so predominant 
throughout the world now? 
Two factors operate to reverse the process of god 
proliferation. The obvious one is that better 
(i.e. "natural") explanations of the phenomena ascribed to 
godly activity are devised. The second is that there are 
economies of scale with monotheism especially if the various 
gods require separate worship. This suggests that there 
will be a move to monotheism as the value of labor time 
increases. 
Presumably the development of agriculture resulted in 
one of the first major wide-spread increases in the value of 
labor time. On would expect, therefore, a reduction in the 
number of gods coincident with the development of 
agriculture. If this explanation is correct, we should find 
monotheistic religions developing in areas of twelve-month 
agriculture before it occurs in other locales. Similarly, 
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at a moment in time, we should find monotheistic religions 
in higher proportion in areas of twelve-month agricultural 
activity tan in other areas. In the far north, the long 
winters would result in extended periods of time during 
which the value of labor was low and therefore the 
development of monotheistic religion would be expected to 
occur at a later date. 
The second historic episode resulting in substantial 
changes in the value of labor is the industrial revolution. 
The implications should apply to this as well. 
Sects and Product Variety 
Religion is different from other products in part 
because consumers gain limited value or even lose value from 
increases in product variety. Consumers value the existence 
of religious sects (subgroups of a given religion) but lose 
value in the presence of additional religions. Addition of 
new religions may attract some new believers but threatens 
the religious fabric of the society. 
Additional religions increase uncertainty about 
requirements for eternal life and altered fate but increase 
the variety of such products as entertainment. As mentioned 
earlier, enforcement of social goals is more difficult when 
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